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GATT and the New Protectionism
T
he successful completion of the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) has generated much optimism
about the future of world trade, and with good
reason. If ratified, the accord will not only eliminate
tariffs on many goods, but will be the first GATT-
round accord to address intellectual property
rights, trade in services, and agricultural subsidies.
An important question, however, is how much
this new accord can limit future protectionism.
When trade liberalization curtails one form of
protectionism, new forms appear almost routinely.
While GATT agreements steadily reduced tariffs
on manufactures (from an average of 40 percent in
1947 to about 5 percent now, as shown in Figure
1), the United States and many other countries
were developing other, more arcane administra-
tive and legal barriers.
What these barriers imply for free trade are
sometimes difficult to understand because often
they have touched on fairness issues. In many
countries policymakers—and their supporters in
industries that face foreign competition—have
devoted much effort to counteract what they
define as unfair trade practices by foreign coun-
tries. Unfair trade practices are typically thought to
include: 1) subsidies on exports by foreign gov-
ernments and 2) dumping, which is the act of
selling goods for a lower price abroad than in the
home or other markets. To offset foreign subsidies
to exports the government of the importing coun-
try sometimes erects special tariffs to raise the
artificially low prices of these goods. These tariff
barriers are referred to as countervailing duties.
Antidumping duties are typically imposed when
the government of an importing country suspects
that the exporting country is dumping goods on
its markets.
The particular circumstances under which
countervailing and antidumping actions are used—
and the procedures developed to assess the “un-
fairness” of others’ trade practices—have raised
suspicions about policymakers’ motivations. Per-
haps, some have argued, these “fairness” doctrines
are vehicles for disguised protectionism.
Allegations of disguised protectionism have
become more common as efforts to preserve
“fair” trade have multiplied. During the 1960s,
GATT member countries initiated fewer than
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twelve antidumping actions per year. By the
second half of the 1970s, the United States alone
averaged more than thirty-five per year. As Table
1 shows, in the 1980s the total of cases initiated
by GATT signatory countries exceeded one hun-
dred per year.
Concerns that “fair” trade laws are vehicles for
protectionism have become even more acute with
the advent of the Uruguay Round. While rough
guidelines for using antidumping and counter-
vailing duties have appeared in past GATT agree-
ments, the Uruguay Round accord has introduced
much more formalization and detail to accommo-
date and codify such retaliation. Moreover, these
codifications greatly resemble those of the United
States, a principal exponent of antidumping and
countervailing measures.
The Uruguay Round’s various approaches
to addressing government trade policy—lower-
ing tariffs here, sanctioning some types of anti-
dumping actions and countervailing duties there—
raise questions about the accord’s overall implica-
tions for free trade. The related central question
addressed in this article is whether the recent
changes in GATT will discourage the most pro-
tectionist aspects of these administered trade regu-
lations. Because the accord adopts many aspects
of U.S. laws and administrative procedures con-
cerning antidumping and countervailing duties,
we use the U.S. experience of recent years to
assess what may be in store for the world trading
environment under the new GATT.
We begin by examining what has been seen
as unfair trade, and we discuss the economic argu-
ments for imposing antidumping and countervail-
ing duties. We then outline how fair trade laws
have been applied in the United States and discuss
why some analysts have claimed that these laws
are biased toward protectionism. Finally, we
assess the impact of the Uruguay Round of GATT
on the application of fair trade laws. We conclude
with an outlook for the future of the world trading
environment.
When is trade unfair?
The express intention of fair trade laws is to
prevent foreign sellers from pricing and selling
anticompetitively or predatorily in your country.
If foreign exporters sell for less in the United
States than at home, or if foreign governments
subsidize exports to the United States, U.S. laws
and rules accommodate U.S. efforts at retaliation.
But is unfair trade really unfair?
Economists often deny that below-cost prices
or foreign export subsidies mean unfair trade.
After all, if foreign firms want to sell cheaply in the
United States, why should U.S. consumers not be
allowed the obvious benefit? While this argument
recognizes the benefits to consumers, it dismisses
the effects of unfair trading on some domestic
producers and ignores other arguments against
unfair trading practices. Moreover, as Bhagwati
(1988) notes, “a free trade regime that does not rein
in or seek to regulate artificial subventions will
likely help trigger its own demise.”
Conversely, in the more concrete world of
government policy, both arguments and govern-
ment policies in support of antidumping and
countervailing duties typically place the interests
of import-competing industries over the interests
of consumers and also over those of producers
who use imported inputs. (See the box entitled
“Do Fair Trade Laws Protect the Economy?”) An
analysis of eight antidumping duties imposed by
the United States between 1989 and 1990 showed
that for each $1 gained by the protected indus-
tries, the U.S. economy as a whole lost $3.60, on
average (Anderson 1993). Moreover, according to
the same study, the cost per job created in the
protected industries was $113,800, which is sub-
stantially higher than the $14,300 average salary
paid for these jobs. The extra cost comes from
the higher price consumers must pay for these
domestic goods and the less efficient use of
domestic resources.
Another argument against unfair trade is that
foreign nations can act predatorily to capture
domestic markets. But this argument is also sub-
ject to criticism. The argument is based on the
assumption that once foreign producers capture
domestic markets, competitors will not re-enter
domestic markets when prices begin to rise. But
if foreign producers cannot block domestic pro-
ducers from re-entering a market after it is cap-
tured, they will have to keep their prices at a
competitive level to maintain their market share.
Some analysts claim that certain high-tech
industries can develop natural barriers to entry
that allow them to capture a particular market andFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 32
Do Fair Trade Laws Protect the Economy?
While antidumping and countervailing laws may pro-
tect particular industries from foreign competition, broader
arguments based on the benefits of these measures to
the whole economy are typically ill founded. There are
basically three arguments for antidumping and counter-
vailing duties. The first is simply that subsidized or
dumped imports of textiles, consumer electronics, and
automobiles cost domestic textile workers, electronics
workers, and auto workers their jobs. In other words,
imports cost Americans their jobs and subsidized or
dumped imports cost even more jobs.
While it is certainly true that imports of textiles or cars
can displace American textile or automobile jobs, it is not
true that trade can reduce the number of jobs in a country
for any sustained period.
The argument that import subsidies or dumping re-
duces overall employment reflects an error known as the
fallacy of composition—the mistaken belief that what is
true for the part is true for the whole. As a matter of simple
arithmetic, large increases in imports inevitably cause
either an increase in exports or in foreign investment.
Generally speaking, if imports of Japanese cars dramati-
cally increase, American exports increase to pay for these
goods. Unless foreigners are giving away what they make,
Americans cannot get foreign products unless they sell
products to foreigners. As a result, the jobs lost in one
industry are replaced by jobs gained in another. Jobs
would only be lost if foreigners gave everthing away.
Using data on unemployment, imports, and exports, for
twenty-three developed countries, Gould, Ruffin, and
Woodbridge (1993) find no simple causal link between
unemployment and import penetration or export perfor-
mance. Within countries, imports had the same correlation
to unemployment as did exports.
Second, there is the argument that foreign producers
sell abroad at below cost because they have a predatory
intent to drive out domestic competition. The idea is that
once they drive out the competition in the domestic
market, they will raise prices and reap monopolistic
profits at the expense of the target country. This argu-
ment, however, assumes that competitors will not re-
enter the market once prices rise. If foreign producers
cannot block domestic producers from re-entering the
market once it is captured, they will have to keep their
prices low in order to maintain market share. Prices that
cannot be raised obviate the benefits to predatory pricing.
Finally, some arguments are based on new theories of
international trade that emphasize monopolistic competi-
tion and international oligopolies. These theories focus on
international economies of scale, learning curves, and in-
novation and down play the assumption of perfect compe-
tition that lies behind the classical arguments for free trade.
In a real world environment, some have argued, other
countries might subsidize their industries and capture U.S.
markets at the expense of future U.S. income.
Although economists have long recognized the impor-
tance of economies of scale, innovation, and international
oligopolies, countries have rarely, if ever, been able to
capture excess profits from other markets for long. The
difficulties with such strategic trade policy arguments are
twofold. First, most arguments for subsidies assume they
are implemented by a benevolent dictator, rather than
political parties representing special interest groups. Most
trade policy decisions are not typically made in the best
interest of the whole country; usually they are the result of
competing political interests. Because of the nature of the
policymaking game, it is hard to argue that foreign industry
subsidies are a concerted effort to capture domestic
markets. Rather, they often reflect some foreign industry’s
power in capturing its own country’s budget.
Second, strategic trade policies are based on theo-
retical models, but their implementation relies heavily on
empirical estimates of industry demand and supply that
can vary substantially over time. Rarely have countries
acted in a deliberate fashion that actually managed to
capture these advantages. For example, some of Japan’s
biggest success stories (TVs, stereos, and VCRs) were
not the industries most heavily targeted by the Japanese
government. Moreover, as these products have become
even more standardized, production has moved out of
Japan to Korea and other Southeast Asian countries.
The inability of governments to pick winners is evidenced
by some of Japan’s failures:
• The Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) first wanted the Japanese automobile indus-
try to produce only trucks and later wanted to limit
the number of automobile companies to a few giants
in particular, attempting to keep Honda out of the car
business. Of course, market forces eventually led
MITI to abandon these plans, but the intervention
generated costs that could have been avoided. Had
MITI been successful, Japan would have paid an
enormous price for this policy.
• The Japanese heavily targeted an analog version of
high definition television (HDTV), but it appears that
digital HDTV—the product of U.S. research and
development—will be the industry standard.
• MITI is now investing in cold fusion, a procedure for
creating nuclear power that has been debunked by
most of the scientific establishment.
These examples and others suggest that even Japan
has done a poor job of picking the winning industries.Economic Review — Third Quarter 1994 33
keep it. Because of what they learn in the pro-
duction process, producers may permanently gain
a cost advantage as production expands. In other
words, by protecting or subsidizing certain in-
dustries, a country may gain a permanent cost
advantage and, therefore, create a natural barrier
to entry. Although this argument is appealing,
there is little evidence to suggest that firms or
countries actually have been able to take advan-
tage of these benefits or have acted in a manner
consistent with pursuing them. As Table 2 indi-
cates, many products subject to antidumping and
countervailing duties, such as stainless steel pipes,
gray portland cement, or pork, are not typically
high-tech industries.
But whether or not government subsidiza-
tion and predatory pricing are practices that fair
trade laws are supposed to address—as the fair
trade rhetoric suggests—fair trade laws have
been so broadly applied that they sometimes
seem to have been used simply to avoid com-
petition. In other words, antidumping and coun-
tervailing duties share many attributes of pure
protectionism.
Why fair trade laws do not always work
as intended: A look at the United States
Contrary to popular notions about dumping,
in U.S. law and under present GATT law, dumping
is not defined as selling below cost with the intent
to capture U.S. markets. Dumping is simply selling
at a lower price in the United States than in other
markets or selling at below average total costs.
Dumping is not defined as predatory behavior.
Antidumping actions do not require any evidence
of intention to monopolize or otherwise drive
competitors out of business.
Opportunities for using the antidumping
laws have not always been so unrestricted. Seventy-
five years ago dumping remedies required proof
that a foreign producer was practicing predatory
pricing. That is, the foreign producer had to be
selling at a loss and with the intention of driving
competitors out of business so as to secure a
monopoly. Early U.S. antidumping regulations
were, in substance, extensions of antitrust law
(Finger 1992).
The antidumping laws of the past placed the
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burden of proof on the accusing industry. Over
time, Congress has dropped the requirement of
intent and instead has focused on the prevention of
injury to domestic firms (Murray 1991). The burden
of proof no longer falls on the accusing industry
but upon the industry or firm that is accused.
Foreign firms are presumed guilty until proven
innocent.
Under current U.S. law, any industry can
approach the Department of Commerce and the
International Trade Commission (ITC) and claim
foreigners are subsidizing exports or are pricing
them lower in the United States than at home. The
Department of Commerce investigates the cases,
and the ITC determines whether material injury has
occurred. Antidumping duties are imposed when
foreign merchandise is sold in the United States
for less than “fair” value. A duty is assessed equal
to the amount by which the estimated foreign
market value exceeds U.S. price. Countervailing
duties are imposed when a foreign country directly
or indirectly subsidizes exports to the United
States. A duty is assessed equal to the amount of
the subsidy or the amount by which the estimated
foreign market value exceeds the U.S. price. (See
the box entitled “U.S. Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duties.”)
While antidumping and countervailing
duty laws are not inconsistent with the desire
to keep trade fair, their current application
permits liberal interpretation of what is and
what is not fair trade. Below we discuss some
of the procedural problems with antidumping
and countervailing duties.
Problems with the application
of U.S. fair trade laws
In the application of antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws, small changes can make big
differences. Juggling the procedures for construct-
ing fair market prices, for identifying injury to a
domestic industry, or for gathering information
from foreign firms can substantially change their
impact. Over the years, in response to domestic
pressures to protect particular industries, these
procedures have often changed so as to increase
the likelihood of finding against foreign producers
and for domestic complainants.
This pattern is not isolated to the United
States and, with the passage of time, countries as
diverse as Canada, Poland, and Mexico have
converged in their procedures for determining
antidumping and countervailing duties. By consid-
ering how antidumping and countervailing laws
are applied in the United States, it may be possible
to assess how the new GATT accord will affect
their use and effects.
Antidumping laws
Pricing below average costs. Although pricing
below average total costs is legal for domestic U.S.
firms, the 1974 Tariff Act broadened antidumping
law to prohibit foreign exporters from doing the
same. It is not unusual for U.S. firms to price
below average total cost (but above average vari-
able cost) because of weak sales. This practice
allows firms to cover labor costs during periods of
weak demand and to avoid shutting down produc-
tion completely. Moreover, firms that sell new
products involving high-tech research and develop-
ment costs typically price below average total
costs during early stages of marketing. As the
product becomes more established and volume
increases, firms recoup their earlier losses. For
example, the new General Motors Saturn factory
only became profitable after five years of losses
(Bovard 1993). Under U.S. antidumping law, if
General Motors were a foreign firm, it would have
been prohibited from selling its cars at a com-
petitive price.
Constructed prices. When foreign firms are
suspected of pricing at below-average total costs,
the Department of Commerce is directed by law
to ignore market information about foreign prices.
For example, in calculating foreign market value,
the Department of Commerce is expected to use a
completely constructed foreign market price if it
believes that 10 percent of the foreign firm’s sales
are below the firm’s average total costs of produc-
tion. In such cases, all the market information on
actual sales is thrown out and an artificial price is
constructed.
One protectionist aspect of this methodology
derives from how foreign costs of production are
calculated. The law requires that not less than 10
percent be included in such calculations for general
expenses plus a minimum of 8 percent for profits.
At the very least, an exporter earning less than 8Economic Review — Third Quarter 1994 35
percent on its U.S. sales will automatically be
found to be dumping. This methodology of cal-
culating costs tends to penalize foreign producers
during slack periods when profits may be squeezed.
In addition, it punishes foreign producers who
simply have lower overall profit margins for the
products they sell.
Opportunities for substantial error in calcu-
lating foreign costs also arise when foreign ex-
change rates are used to convert foreign prices to
U.S. prices. In a 1989 U.S. case against Venezuela,
the United States found a 259.71-percent dumping
margin on imports of Venezuelan aluminum
sulfate. To reach this finding, U.S. officials calcu-
lated prices using Venezuela’s official exchange
rate of 14.5 bolivars per dollar, rather than the free
market exchange rate of 39.5 bolivars per dollar
that the company actually used (Bovard 1992, 3).
Even when foreign firms are not suspected
of pricing below average total costs, constructed
foreign prices can be used. If a foreign-made pro-
duct is not sold in its home country, comparing
home-country with foreign-country prices becomes
difficult. In this case a fair market price must also
be constructed. For example, Polish made golf
carts sold in the United States were a problem for
U.S. officials because the Poles did not play golf
and did not sell golf carts in Poland. The United
States mounted a search for comparable countries
whose wages and other costs could be used to
reconstruct Poland’s hypothetical market price.
The choice for a comparable country was Spain,
despite its different economic structure and wages
that were substantially higher than Poland’s
(Bhagwati 1988, 5).
Data requirements. Constructed prices are also
legally allowed when accused foreign firms do
not respond quickly with information requested
by the Department of Commerce. It is important
to understand the circumstances surrounding
these requests because of the implications they
have for the continuation of protectionism. When
a U.S. firm charges a foreign competitor with
dumping, the Department of Commerce requests
detailed cost information from the foreign com-
petitor. The Department of Commerce does not
simply compare the U.S. and foreign prices but
subtracts a number of items from the price of the
The U.S. government imposes antidumping duties if
foreign merchandise is sold in the United States for less
than fair market value. Less than fair market value sales
are those priced below the foreign producer’s average
total costs or below the price of the good in the home
market. The U.S. industry must also be materially injured,
which means it has lost sales to foreign producers.
Antidumping duties equal the amount by which the esti-
mated foreign market value exceeds the U.S. price.
To determine dumping, agents in the Department of
Commerce compare the price charged in the home
market (or a third country market if no sales take place in
the home country) to the price charged in the United
States and the average total cost of production in the
foreign market. The home country prices are determined
using the value of the exchange rate prevailing at the time
the foreign goods are first sold in the United States, rather
than the exchange rate prevailing at the time the goods
are exported to the United States. If the Department of
Commerce suspects that at least 10 percent of domestic
sales are below average total costs, data on foreign
market prices are not used and a constructed foreign
U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duties1
market price is created. In determining injury, the ITC
assumes that a foreign firm that sells in the United States
at prices below that country’s domestic prices will cause
injury to the U.S. industry.
Countervailing duties are imposed if a direct or indi-
rect foreign subsidy (referred to as a bounty or grant in
U.S. trade laws) is paid for the production or exportation
goods to the United States. If the foreign country is a
signatory of the GATT antisubsidy code, an injury test is
applied. The countervailing duties are set to equal the
amount of the net subsidy.
The injury test for countervailing duties consists of
studying current and potential harm by imports to an
existing U.S. industry. The ITC examines increases in
plant closings and unemployment and decreases in
capacity utilization and profitability. The ITC also studies
general U.S. economic conditions to determine whether
imports are responsible for an industry’s decline.
1 We derived these definitions from P.K.M. Tharakan (1991) and
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foreign good sold in the United States—including
U.S. tariffs, insurance, ocean freight, handling and
port charges, as well as brokerage and freight
charges in the home country. It is not unusual for
dumping to be found even when the price of the
foreign product is higher in the United States than
in the country of origin. The price appears lower
during the procedure because the Department of
Commerce makes subtractions to the foreign
exporter’s price but not the U.S. producer’s price.
Moreover, just the volume of data the U.S.
government requires of foreign firms in such cases
can be a deterrent to trade. The Department of
Commerce may present an accused foreign firm
with a questionnaire as long as one hundred
pages that requests specific accounting data on
individual sales in the home market, data on sales
to the United States, and all the detailed data
needed to adjust for tariffs, shipping, selling, and
distribution costs. Information must be recorded
and transmitted to the Department of Commerce
in English and in a computer-readable format
within a short deadline stipulated under the U.S.
statutes (Murray 1991, 34).1
Compliance with these information requests
can be difficult, particularly for small firms. If the
firm or industry fails to satisfy all requests for in-
formation or fails to submit by the specified dead-
lines, the U.S. law authorizes use of what is called
best information available (BIA). BIA typically
consists of information provided by the U.S. com-
plainant firm. Arguing that BIA is biased, Baldwin
and Moore (1991) show that the average dump-
ing duty based on information from foreign firms
was 27.9 percent, compared with a 66.7-percent
average with BIA.
Averaging foreign and domestic prices. Even
when Congress removes rules that seem to offer a
protectionist cast toward governmental determina-
tions of dumping or subsidies, the use of the old
procedures may persist anyway. A particularly
instructive example involves the determination of
dumping through an apples-to-oranges price com-
parison that was waived in the Trade Act of 1984
but that is sometimes still used anyway.
The procedure involves averaging foreign
prices and comparing this average with individual
U.S. domestic transactions to determine dumping.
Comparing average foreign prices with individual
U.S. domestic transactions turns out to mean that
even if domestic and foreign prices are exactly the
same every day, instances of dumping can be
found if prices change at all.
To understand why, suppose that Korean
toasters sold in Korea for $23 on Monday, $25 on
Tuesday, and $27 on Wednesday and the same
kind of toasters were sold in the United States at
the identical prices on those same days—$23 on
Monday, $25 on Tuesday, and $27 on Wednesday.
The average price in Korea over those three days
would be $25. But by a comparison of the aver-
age price of $25 with the average daily sale in the
United States, Monday’s price of $23 turns out to
be $2 below the average price of $25 in Korea
(and also $2 below the average price in the
United States, since it is also $25). Under the
averaging rule, the discovery that a toaster sold
for $23 on Monday when the average Monday-
Tuesday-Wednesday price was $25 is grounds for
the finding of a $2 (8-percent) “dumping margin.”
This means that Korea is guilty of dumping and
subject to punishment, even though there is no
price difference between toasters in Korea and
toasters in the United States on any given day.
Price margins. Considering the substantial room
for error in calculating foreign prices, the price
differentials, or margins, that define dumping are
strikingly small. In the United States, a foreign
industry is subject to antidumping findings if it
sells its products for less than 99.5 percent of
what is estimated to be fair market value. Because
99.5 percent of fair market value is 0.5 percent
less than 100 percent, this rule is called the 0.5-
percent de minimis rule.
Review. Despite legitimate questions about the
methodology of calculating antidumping duties,
once a dumping duty is imposed, it may remain
in force for years without periodic review of
whether the foreign country has ceased dumping.
1 Using data requests as a from of harassment is not
peculiar to the United States. In 1991, Mexico filed an
antidumping case against U.S. denim producers and
gave U.S. producers fifteen days to fill out a twenty-five-
page detailed report on accounting and production
processes. The report had to be in Spanish and trans-
ported in computer-readable format.Economic Review — Third Quarter 1994 37
Countervailing duty laws
Countervailing duty regulations are also
susceptible to protectionist biases. The United
States imposes countervailing duties on foreign
exports that receive government subsidies. Like
the antidumping rules, countervailing duty laws
represent attempts to create fair trade. But also
like the antidumping laws, countervailing duty
laws involve procedures that can impede trade.
Some of the same biases are common to both
antidumping and countervailing actions, such as
the use of best information available. Other biases
that are unique to countervailing duty laws are
described below.
Defining a countervailable subsidy. Many
foreign governments, and the United States, sub-
sidize their industries. According to U.S. laws
applicable to countervailing subsidies, foreign
subsidies are countervailable only if they affect a
country’s exports. Although a foreign subsidy to
restaurants would, therefore, probably not prove
countervailable in the United States, some compli-
cations over what affects exports do sometimes
emerge.
The complications arise when subsidies to
an exporter are indirect. Suppose, for example,
that the exporter purchases water from a water
authority that is subsidized, and that the water
authority passes some of its subsidy benefits on
to customers in the form of lower water prices.
Passing on part of a subsidy in the form of lower
prices is typical in many countries, but the foreign
producer who benefits may be subject to U.S.
countervailing duties. Interestingly, if foreign
nations applied these same rules to the United
States, agricultural exports from California would
be subject to countervailing duties because of de
facto federal water subsidies to California farmers.
Accounting procedures. In some cases, simple
accounting procedures followed by the United
States do not accommodate offsetting foreign taxes
that dissipate the effects of foreign subsidies. In
the 1983 countervailing duty case against Argen-
tine wool, the United States chose to ignore a 17-
percent export tax that more than offset the 6-percent
export subsidy that had been deemed actionable.
The United States had argued that the two pro-
grams—the export subsidy and the export tax—
had been enacted under separate laws and that
only the subsidy was worthy of attention (Bovard
1992, 17).
To sum up, U.S. antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws make it easy for domestic firms
to seek protection from foreign competitors, even
if the behavior of these competitors is not preda-
tory. Recall that the law formerly focused on foreign
producers who sold at a loss so as to drive domestic
firms out of business. Now U.S. producers have
much more liberal grounds for redress. Below,
we discuss some of the ways in which the new
GATT accord changes the protectionist bias in
antidumping and countervailing duty laws.
The new GATT agreement: A new direction?
The Uruguay Round of GATT has adopted
antidumping and countervailing duty regulations
much like those found in the United States. In
countries whose antidumping and countervailing
rules were not fully developed, this carryover may
lead to more protectionism. But many developing
countries have already begun to follow the example
of developed countries. In 1992, Brazil imposed
21-percent countervailing duties on powdered
milk products from the European Community
(GATT 1993). Nevertheless, harmonization of
regulations can also lead to greater transparency
and less arbitrary implementation. The European
Community is now contesting Brazil’s action to
GATT, claiming that Brazil did not prove that
material injury had occurred because of subsi-
dized powdered milk imports.
Besides moving toward more uniformity,
the new GATT accord erects roadblocks on some
of the United States’ and other countries’ favorite
avenues for protectionism. Although opportuni-
ties for protectionist pressures persist under the
new GATT agreement, the new accord represents
a step toward freer trade.
Antidumping
The new antidumping rules make adminis-
tered protectionism a bit more difficult to imple-
ment, but opportunities remain. One problem, as
noted by Finger (1994), is that the new rules (like
the old ones) are ambiguous. Indeed, dumping is
not defined; only antidumping is. The definition of
antidumping, however, is simply a list of specificFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 38
restricted actions rather than a complete descrip-
tion of practices that should be followed.2 But
despite its poorly articulated purpose, the agree-
ment does address some procedural problems
that have appeared in past antidumping practices.
Areas where protectionist bias is likely to fall.
Among the most widely criticized practices in the
application of U.S. antidumping laws is the pro-
clivity to construct fair market prices when actual
market prices are available. As noted, the Depart-
ment of Commerce can use a completely con-
structed foreign market price if it suspects that 10
percent of a foreign firm’s sales are below some
estimate of average total costs of production. Past
use of such constructed prices has been shown to
increase, by a substantial margin, the likelihood
of a finding of illegal dumping. Under the new
GATT rules, such prices may still be constructed
but are subject to more restrictions. U.S. officials,
for example, would be permitted to use a com-
pletely constructed foreign market price but they
must claim that 20 percent (as opposed to the
present 10 percent) of a foreign firm’s sales are
below some estimate of its costs of production.
The Uruguay Round agreement will also
affect the current U.S. 0.5-percent de minimis
rule. Under this rule, a foreign firm that is
found to have sold its products in the United
States for as little as 0.5 percent less than some
estimate of fair market value could be subject
to antidumping duties. The new GATT accord
contains a 2-percent de minimis rule that super-
sedes the 0.5-percent rule, which may limit the
most frivolous actions.
The Uruguay Round agreement also addresses
the problem of comparing average foreign market
prices to individual domestic sales. Recall that,
according to this procedure, individual prices in
the United States are compared with average
foreign prices. This means that any price fluctua-
tions at all during the investigation can generate an
affirmative dumping finding. If a product’s prices
happened to change during an investigation,
prices of the foreign product imported into the
United States would, on at least one day, fall
below the total-period average. Just as every
human cannot have above-average intelligence,
there will likewise always be one price that is
below the average price that, hence, could result
in a dumping finding.
In most cases under the Uruguay Round
accord, governments pursuing antidumping inves-
tigations agree to compare average foreign prices
with average domestic prices and individual foreign
sales with individual domestic sales. However,
even under the new Uruguay Round agreement,
some provisions sanction the apples-to-oranges
comparison of average prices to individual prices.
The Uruguay Round accord sanctions this practice
when a government investigates charges of spot
dumping, a dumping category that involves brief
dips below fair market prices.
Another detail of the new accord, the dispute
settlement mechanism, also warrants attention.
The new dispute settlement mechanism may have
only a marginal impact in thwarting protectionism
overall, but it does contain elements that can
thwart protectionism in some cases. Previously,
when a country illegally imposed an antidumping
or countervailing duty on another country, GATT
had little power to investigate the case, let alone
discipline the country. Any country, including the
country acting illegally, could stop the investiga-
tion process. Moreover, even if the case proceeded
to a finding of illegality, no discipline could be
imposed upon the offending country unless the
country itself agreed.
The Uruguay Round accord, however, does
not require the offending country to agree either
to its investigation or discipline. Moreover, if a
country does not implement a GATT panel’s
recommendations within a certain period, the
country that was harmed can seek authorization
to retaliate.
Among the most significant moves toward
limiting administered protection is a new sunset
rule that requires a review of injury each five years
after an antidumping order is issued. That is, anti-
dumping actions can no longer continue indefi-
nitely without further review, as has been common
2 Finger (1994, 2), moreover, notes that, because the Uru-
guay Round agreement “wraps specific disputes with a
distracting legalese, it represents a distancing from not a
step toward, negotiating to reach agreement on the trade
restrictions that are now sanctified—falsely sanctified—by
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in some countries, including the United States.3
More generally, the Uruguay Round enhances
freer trade through greater transparency and due
process. The agreement makes the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws more specific, per-
mitting exporters to form more concrete and
accurate expectations about the criteria for fair
pricing. The agreement more fully defines avenues
for dispute settlement, which also will increase
the likelihood of freer trade and can lower the
risk to traders. These last details are important
because, while U.S. firms have been very active in
levying antidumping charges during the past
fifteen years, this avenue of combating import
competition has become widely used in other
countries only more recently and can be expected
to increase in the future.4
Areas where protectionist bias is unlikely to
change. While the new GATT agreement is likely
to reduce the protectionist bias in the areas men-
tioned above, in other areas it will have a smaller
effect. The extensive documentation that the U.S.
Department of Commerce and other countries
impose on foreign producers accused of dumping
is not addressed in the Uruguay Round agree-
ment. In the United States, for example, the re-
quirement that foreign firms complete around one
hundred pages of documentation in a tight time
frame, in English, and in a computer-readable
format, is not likely to change. GATT does not
reduce countries’ opportunities to impose what
some have charged are unreasonable and arbitrary
demands on foreign producers.
Despite outward appearances to the con-
trary, another area in which the new agreement is
unlikely to change much is in the determination
of injury. Traditionally, if the amount of “dumped”
imports is not great enough to inflict some measure
of material injury to an industry, then antidumping
duties are not legal under GATT. But the defini-
tion of material injury has been left ambiguous
up to now, and broadly subject to each country’s
interpretation. The typical interpretation is that
any foreign sales that displace domestic sales are
cause for injury.
In contrast, the new accord defines the line
at which dumped imports are to be considered
negligible (that is, too small to be injurious and
therefore not subject to antidumping duties). The
volume of dumped imports defines as negligible
(and therefore not subject to antidumping duties)
is less than 3 percent of total imports of the prod-
uct or, if more than one country is subject to a
dumping complaint, 7 percent of total imports. If
a Japanese automobile maker is selling inexpen-
sive cars in the United States and is alleged to be
dumping, but sales of its cars are less than 3 per-
cent of total imports, no duties will be assessed
against its exports.
There is reason to suspect that the new
negligibility rule will rarely prove much of a con-
straint upon judgments of injury—and that the
rule may prove less restrictive to protectionists
than current U.S. rules. Consider the case of a
foreign firm that is sole exporter of some product
to the United States. Suppose, in this hypothetical
case, that U.S. manufacturers make so much of a
similar product that the foreign exporter’s sales
account for only a 0.0001 percent share of the
U.S. market. Under the new accord, a dumping
suit could be filed against this firm because its
share of total imports of this product is 100 percent,
even though its share of the domestic market is
only 0.0001. That is, the negligibility requirement
is 3 percent of total imports, not 3 percent of the
total market.
It is hard to know if firms will file complaints
about dumping at such a trivial level in the future.
It does appear possible that, if such a 3-percent
of imports negligibility requirement had been
deemed sufficient to determine injury in the past,
the number of injury determinations would have
been greater than they, in fact, were. Finger (1994,
7) suggests that, had the new GATT 3-percent
criterion been the sole standard for evaluating the
steel dumping petitions, injury would have been
ruled in every case that the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission rejected in July 1993.
3 Indeed, some antidumping actions have been in force
without reconsideration for decades.
4 In the past, both the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund have sanctioned and—at times—even
encouraged assistance-seeking developing countries
to enact antidumping rules, although antidumping is no
longer encouraged.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 40
Although the new GATT accord simplifies
the process of disciplining countries that abuse the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws, there is
little GATT can actually do besides make recom-
mendations. As with the old GATT agreement,
even a recommendation to discipline may not be
implemented. Moreover, the dispute settlement
mechanism will preclude GATT panels from impos-
ing their own judgments of fact or law on national
antidumping authorities when the authorities have
acted according to their own laws (U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce 1994). Finger and Fung (1993,
1) note that since July of 1993, only five GATT
panels were able to determine illegal antidumping
actions, but not one these actions has since been
lifted. This problem is unlikely to change under
the new GATT agreement.
Subsidy countervailing actions
Although the Uruguay Round agreement
does not define dumping, it does define subsidy,
and it differentiates clearly between subsidies that
may be countervailed and those that may not.
This transparency represents a significant step
toward encouraging trade because it lowers the
risk of retaliatory surprises. Under the new accord,
some subsidies warrant out-and-out prohibition
(those that are contingent on export performance
or on using domestic inputs), while other subsidies
may be grounds for taking actions.5 This clarifica-
tion of prohibited, actionable, and nonactionable
subsidies may curtail arbitrary actions that govern-
ments could otherwise choose to explain away as
subject to their needs for flexibility and discretion.
While the transparency of this portion of
the accord moves governments toward freer trade,
the accord’s peculiar perspective on whom and
how subsidies benefit foreign producers does not.
The accord focuses on the subsidy’s benefit to
the recipient, without conditioning this focus on
the trade impacts of the benefits. Subsidies do
not, in fact, necessarily distort trade just because
they benefit trading firms. As Francis, Palmeter,
and Anspacher (1991) show, subsidies do not
distort trade unless they lower the marginal cost
of production. That is, subsidies can benefit
shareholders without materially influencing the
output produced by the firm or the prices it
charges.
Table 3 presents a summary of the likely
effects of the new GATT accord on U.S. anti-
dumping and countervailing duty actions. As the
table summarizes, the overall effect of the accord
on U.S. fair trade laws appears to be a modest
reduction in the opportunities they offer for out-
and-out protectionism.
Conclusions
Despite their limitations, the countervailing
duty and antidumping portions of the Uruguay
Round accord generally move nations toward freer
trade, and it is important to clarify the context in
which they do it. Like any broad trade accord, the
Uruguay Round accord represents a synthesis of
pressures for and against protectionism and,
therefore, it includes rules whose effects on trade
seem contradictory.
One of the most serious problems in trade
liberalization is that, as more transparent forms of
protectionism are noticed and then negotiated
away, rent-seeking groups devise replacements
that are less transparent.6
An important incarnation of this phenomenon
is administered protection, which often takes the
form of countervailing and antidumping actions.
This claim should surprise no one, considering
that the antidumping and countervailing duty
portions of the accord correspond so closely to
5 As a reflection of the powerful agricultural lobby found in
many countries, the Uruguay Round agreement’s ac-
tionable subsidies section does not apply to agricultural
product subsidies, as mentioned in Article 13 of the
Agreement on Agriculture. In past judgments, this ex-
clusion of agricultural subsidies has resulted in peculiar
findings. For example, a Canadian program directed
toward subsidizing the poorest 5 percent of the popula-
tion was judged an unfair trading practice, while U.S.
federal water subsidies to agriculture in California’s
Central Valley have not been judged unfair (see Francis,
Palmeter, and Anspacher 1991).
6 For a much fuller elucidation of this issue, see  Magee,
Brock, and Young’s discussion of the voter information
paradox. According to their theory, as voter opposition to
protectionism becomes increasingly sophisticated, politi-
cal parties respond with higher equilibrium levels of more
opaque distortions.Economic Review — Third Quarter 1994 41
New Rule
Five-year sunset rule on antidumping duties. After five
years, dumping duties will be terminated unless a new
review takes place.
The level below which dumping margins will be
ignored (the de minimis rule) rises from 0.5 percent to
2.0 percent.
Level at which sales below cost are considered
substantial rises from 10 percent to 20 percent.
Defines a preference for comparing average domestic
prices with average foreign prices or individual
domestic prices with individual foreign prices.
However, countries can still compare averages with
individual prices when spot dumping is alleged.
GATT panels cannot impose their judgments on a
country when the country, in its finding of dumping,
has acted in an unbiased and objective manner.
Dumped imports from all countries will not be con-
sidered injurious to domestic firms if they constitute
less 7 percent of total imports.
Specifically defines those subsidies and that are
prohibited, those that are countervailable, and those
that are not countervailable.
Table 3
The Uruguay Round of GATT: Effects on U.S. Antidumping
And Countervailing Actions
Effect
Reduces the likelihood of permanent protection being
granted to industries when foreign dumping is no
longer present.
Slightly reduces the number of the most frivolous
antidumping investigations.
Slightly decreases the number of cases in which
foreign market price information is disregarded. May
limit frivolous antidumping findings.
Slightly decreases opportunity to find dumping when
prices are identical in the foreign and home markets.
May slightly increase the opportunity to find dumping.
Unlikely to have a significant effect on dumping
actions.
Decreases the scope of countervailing actions,
reduces the possibility of frivolous cases.
the United States’ legal expressions on the same
subjects. After all, the U.S. process involves such
detail and obscurity that it in one month has in-
volved seventy-two different investigations just on
steel imports. Such a process represents far more
opportunities for disguised protectionism than
tariffs would, even if forty of the seventy-two
investigations did not lead to antidumping or
countervailing duty actions.
It is in this context that we may see the
administered protection portion of the Uruguay
Round as liberalizing trade. Countervailing and
antidumping actions often represent abstruse
attempts to redistribute welfare from consumers
to producers. While consumers benefit from the
lower prices of foreign suppliers, domestic pro-
ducers typically can make more money by charging
higher prices, and they typically can charge higher
prices when they have less competition from
foreigners.
But if all this is true, how can it be argued
that, on the whole, antidumping and counter-
vailing duty rules in the Uruguay Round accord
of GATT represent a move toward freer trade?
The Uruguay Round agreement more fully codi-
fies what protectionism is permissible and what is
not. The accord provides for dispute settlement
and, in a number of cases, offers explicit bound-
aries between what may and what may not be
actionable.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 42
As a result, while the accord includes what
Finger refers to as “trade restrictions that are now
sanctified,” it also constitutes trade restrictions that
are now specified. The transparency of the agree-
ment lowers, as we have argued, the risk of what
may otherwise be surprise retaliations. The fuller
authority of the dispute settlement mechanism—
regardless of how limited this authority remains—
increases the likelihood that these rules will be
followed.
There is always the possibility that new,
even more fully disguised forms of protectionism
will replace the old ones. However, despite the
attempts of firms to disguise protectionism, world
trade has been increasing. World trade as a share
of total world gross domestic product grew from
27 percent in 1970 to nearly 40 percent in 1992.
Given the increasing importance of trade to most
economies, political momentum is likely to favor
more open markets. By making any remaining
protectionism more transparent, the new GATT
accord reinforces the trend toward a more globa-
lized market.
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